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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE NEW LOCALISM IN WELFARE ADVOCACY

MATTHEW DILLER*
Much ink has been spilled examining and critiquing various modes of
advocacy that lawyers for the poor use, don’t use, or are alleged to use.1 When
it comes to poverty law, it seems that the landscape is filled with arm chair
generals, Monday morning quarterbacks and back seat drivers all advising,
criticizing and mixing metaphors in a cacophonous din. Accordingly, I
hesitate to offer another contribution to this literature. I will restrict myself to
a single point—forms of advocacy cannot be considered apart from the legal
structure and context of the object of advocacy. This point seems obvious, but
observers seldom draw this connection, concentrating instead on issues that are
internal to the advocacy process, such as the relationship between advocates
and clients. Second, a corollary to this point: As the legal structures shift and
evolve, methods of advocacy must also adapt to these changing circumstances.
This essay elaborates on this point and its corollary by examining forms of
advocacy in the area of welfare. First, it points out the connection between the
advocacy forms favored by poverty lawyers and the structure of the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. In particular, it shows
how AFDC and the class action went hand in hand. The centralized and rule
based structure of AFDC made it particularly susceptive to class action
litigation. Next, this essay discusses the growing criticism of the class action
as a tool for social reform, and the implications of this criticism for welfare
advocacy. Finally, this essay examines the structure of welfare as it is
emerging from the process of welfare reform and highlights some of the
ramifications of these changes for welfare advocacy. As the welfare system
becomes increasingly decentralized and fragmented, critical decisions are
increasingly made on the local level. Accordingly, effective advocacy must
also be structured to influence decisions locally. Successful advocacy will
depend on identifying the loci of decision making in the new regime of welfare
and exploiting or creating opportunities to exert influence at these points.

* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. For a compilation of scholarly writing about the practice of poverty law, see
Bibliography to the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services to Low Income Persons:
Professional and Ethical Issues, 67 FORD. L. REV. 2731 (1999).
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1. AFDC and the Law Reform Model
In the 1960s, the law reform model of advocacy emerged as the dominant
means used by poverty lawyers to effect social change.2 The law reform
model posited that social change can be brought about through test cases and
class action litigation. Analogizing from the litigation strategy of civil rights
activists, poverty lawyers sought to use the courts to establish core principles
concerning the rights of people in poverty and to implement and enforce these
principles through judicial decree. The test case model was first applied in the
poverty law context by Edward Sparer and the Center for Social Welfare
Policy and Law.3 As used by its progenitors, the test case model focused
heavily on the goal of establishing welfare rights, and many of the most well
known cases brought by poverty lawyers dealt with the subject of welfare.4
Public benefit programs were a natural fit with this advocacy strategy.
First, the programs were run by large government agencies, so that advocacy
for systemic change could target a single institution. A change in policy by a
welfare agency affects thousands of people. In contrast, in many other areas of
vital importance to people in poverty, social conditions can only be altered by
changing the conduct of thousands of individuals. In the important areas of
health care, housing, and employment, the critical decisions affecting poor
individuals and communities are principally made by large numbers of private
parties that cannot possibly be subjected to a single court decree. These
problems are polycentric, resulting from the interplay of individuals, market
forces, and institutional constraints. They fit poorly into the traditional bipolar rubric of litigation, which requires one or more similarly situated
plaintiffs who are pitted in opposition to no more than a few defendants.5 It is
by no means clear who one sues in order to create rights to housing, health care
or jobs for people in need.
This is not to say that the law reform model could not be used in these
fields. The judicial recognition of the warranty of habitability and other rights
2. See MARTHA DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS & THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT
(1993); Allen Redlich, Who Will Litigate Constitutional Issues for the Poor?, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 745 (1992).
3. Martha Davis’ fascinating history of the Center for Social Welfare Policy and Law
provides a thorough examination of how Sparer and his colleagues borrowed and adapted the
approach of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. See DAVIS, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). For a comprehensive discussion of law reform litigation in the
area of welfare, see Barbara Sard, The Role of the Courts in Welfare Litigation, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 367 (1988). See generally SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES:
INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS (1994).
5. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976).
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for tenants shows that the law reform strategy could yield benefits even in
these areas.6 But the impact of litigation victories in a field such as housing is
inherently difficult to ascertain. The task of improving housing conditions in a
given city or state depends on changing the conduct of tens of thousands of
independent landlords. In housing and other areas, advocates attempted to
overcome the problem of polycentricity by concentrating on the portions of the
issue in which government is heavily involved. For example, poverty lawyers
have focused on public housing7 and public funding for health care through the
Medicaid program.8 Although both of these focuses achieved important gains,
they provided only a limited perspective on these problems that did not really
strike at their heart. In contrast, the welfare system seemed tailor-made for the
law reform approach. A lawsuit directed at the administrators of a state AFDC
program, or at the Department of Health and Human Services could produce a
judicial order requiring, in one swoop, that all applicants or recipients be
treated in a new and different manner.
In addition, by the late 1960s the AFDC program became increasingly
rule-based.9 Prior to that point, the program was administered through a social
work model, in which critical decisions were left to the professional discretion
of case workers.10 Thus, even though the programs were administered by
single agencies, the agencies themselves relied on comparatively few fixed
rules. The increasingly rule-based nature of the welfare system facilitated the
reliance on litigation-based advocacy strategies in a number of ways. First, in

6. See, e.g., Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (finding
implied warranty of habitability in leases for rental apartments). Cf., Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56 (1972) (rejecting due process challenge to summary eviction procedure).
7. See, e.g., Miles v. Metropolitan Dade Co., 916 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 898 (1991) (class action challenging housing authority practice of charging tenants for
court costs in unsuccessful eviction proceedings); Durrett v. Housing Authority of the City of
Providence, 896 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1990) (approving consent decree in class action challenge to
conditions in public housing). I do not mean to suggest the poverty lawyers have ignored issues
relating to private sector low income housing, only that they have recognized that a focus on
public or subsidized housing can leverage their limited resources.
8. See, e.g., Boatman v. Hammons, 164 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 1998) (class action challenging
improper notice of denials of Medicaid assistance for transportation expenses); Catanzano v.
Wing, 103 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 1996) (class action challenging reduction in Medicaid home health
care); Alexander v. Britt, 89 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1996) (declining to modify consent decree setting
deadlines for processing Medicaid applications).
9. See William Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy & Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J.
1198 (1983). It could be argued that the shift to a rule based system was itself the product of
poverty law advocacy. Although this point has some validity, in the late 1960s, increasing
reliance on rules was a general trend in administration. See Richard Pierce, Rulemaking and the
APA, 32 TULSA L.J. 185, 188-91 (1996). See also KENNETH DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 52-96 (1969) (arguing for increased use of fixed rules as a means of
constraining administrative discretion).
10. See Simon, supra note 9, at 1201-1203.
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a rule-based system, agency policies are more easily discerned and therefore
more readily challenged in litigation. In the absence of formal rules, the
operative policies of a welfare agency cannot be challenged unless they are
uncovered and their existence proven, a process often difficult and resource
intensive.11
Second, the multiple tiers of authority in the AFDC program resulted in
many different sources of rules. Each program was subject to a federal statute
and regulations, as well as a state statute and regulations. Conflicts between
these many sources of authority provided a fertile source for legal claims that
could be exploited in the court room to the benefit of recipients.12 Moreover,
the legal claims arising from these conflicts fell well within the ambit of
traditional judicial functions. Many of the cases required only the traditional
judicial function of statutory interpretation, deciding whether one set of rules
complies with another set. AFDC litigation seldom broke new ground at the
remedial stage, as ongoing judicial supervision of welfare administration was
seldom ordered. In a rule based system, an injunction generally led to the
recission of one rule and the substitution of a revised version in its stead.13
Welfare class actions rarely tested the remedial powers of the courts in the
same way as litigation over prison conditions, treatment of residents of long
term care facilities, or school desegregation.
Finally, the rule based structure of the AFDC program facilitated the use of
the class action. Because large numbers of individuals could be harmed by a
single rule of general applicability, class certification requirements were easily
met. The prerequisites of typicality, commonality and numerosity were not
difficult to fulfill in such a context.14
Many have written about the allure of litigation as an apparent “magic
bullet” for dispatching social problems.15 In the context of welfare advocacy,
however, the focus on litigation also had some grounding in reality. The
structure of the AFDC program made welfare a particularly fertile ground for
test case and class action litigation, and poverty lawyers exploited this match
the fullest extent that they could.
11. Agencies frequently claim that less formal means of instruction such as guidelines or
training materials do not constitute binding policy statements and thus do not reflect the official
position of the agency.
12. See, e.g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552
(1970); Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974); Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1974). See
generally Sard, supra note 4 (explaining how welfare litigation shifted from a focus on
constitutional challenges to statutory claims after the decision in Dandridge v. Williams).
13. The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from
ordering retroactive payments of benefits to recipients. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
14. See Fed. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
15. See generally GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 336-343 (1991) (concluding
that “courts act as ‘fly paper’ for social references who succumb to the ‘lure of litigation’”).
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2. Critique of the Law Reform Model
Over the years, academics and poverty lawyers have become increasingly
aware of the shortcomings of the law reform model. In fact, much of the
writing on poverty lawyering consists of a cataloging of the deficiencies in
litigation as a vehicle for social change.16 In the place of litigation based
strategies, critics have counseled poverty lawyers to focus on building low
income communities by nurturing grass roots activism and helping to build
community institutions.17 This approach seeks to empower poor communities
to achieve their own ends, with the lawyer serving principally as a resource of
knowledge and expertise.
The critics of the law reform model focused on the fact that litigation based
strategies of necessity place the lawyer in the forefront of the effort.18 The idea
of effecting sweeping change through the vehicle of a class action law suit,
often rests on the image of the lawyer as hero—a savior who brings justice to
the masses. The prominence of the lawyer in his arrangement, however, does
not further the development of leadership and organization that is indigenous
to the community served.19 Indeed, some have argued that litigation strategies
may have the negative consequence of encouraging reformers to look to the
courts for salvation rather than doing the hard work necessary to mount a
political or public relations campaign.20 Critics have also pointed out that the
law reform model favors a focus on issues that can be addressed through
litigation, rather than on the needs of the community.21 The question of
whether there is a legal claim and how strong it is may take precedence over
the question of which problem is most urgent or central to the lives of clients.
Inherent in these criticisms is a belief that litigation strategies cannot, or
frequently do not, yield results that are sufficiently compelling to outweigh
these drawbacks. Accordingly, many critics have also questioned whether
litigation can really bring about lasting gains for people in poverty. When
courts order the expansion of substantive or procedural rights, adversaries can
respond by toughening the system at other points. Litigation for social change
can be seen as a battle with Hydra – as one head is stricken off, two more take
its place. Examples of this pattern can be readily identified in the area of
welfare, where Congress overruled a string of litigation successes by amending
16. See, e.g., GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISON OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Anthony Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992); Lucie White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Dreifontein on
Lawyering and Power, 43 WISC. L. REV. 699 (1988).
17. See, e.g., LOPEZ, supra note 16, at 32-38.
18. See id. at 14-16 (describing how a test case lawyer chooses the clients to fit the case,
rather than the other way around).
19. See White, supra note 16, at 755.
20. Id. at 742; Alfieri, supra note 16, at 837-838.
21. White, supra note 16, at 757.
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the Social Security Act and adding provisions that were even more harsh than
those originally challenged.22
As I have argued elsewhere, these critiques can be overdrawn. Litigation
strategies can yield positive results for poor clients.23 It is difficult to contest
the proposition that lawsuits such as Shapiro v. Thompson24 and King v.
Smith25 yielded many rewards for poor families.
More importantly, the drawbacks of litigation must be considered in light
of the difficulties that accompany the alternative approaches. Litigation has
proven attractive precisely because the political process has often looked so
bleak.26 In a system dominated by money, it is not surprising that poor
communities generally fare poorly in the political arena. Not only do poor
people lack the resources to gain political clout, they are frequently targets of
blame for many social ills. The focus on litigation can be seen as an attempt to
appeal to the arm of government that is least influenced by money and social
scapegoating. Although the judiciary is far from immune from either of these
influences,27 it strives to appear as a neutral arbiter of the rule of law. Poor
people can and do win in court.
Nonetheless, the critique of litigation is not without force, particularly as a
caution against an exclusive or reflexive reliance on litigation based strategies.
The limits of litigation call for a diversification of approaches, rather than
abandonment of the lawsuit as a vehicle for seeking social change.28 This
recognition of the limits of litigation based strategies together with growing
reluctance of the judiciary to interfere with the administration of public benefit
programs has posed a major challenge for advocates working on welfare and
other public benefits programs.

22. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981)
(amending Social Security Act to undo the result of several Supreme Court decisions favoring
AFDC recipients).
23. See Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1401
(1995); See also Lynn Kelly, Lawyering for Poor Communities on the Cusp of the Next Century,
25 FORDHAM URBAN. L.J. 721 (1998).
24. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
25. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
26. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1277 (1993).
27. In many states judges are elected for fixed terms, and are thus dependent on campaign
contributions. See William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns Signal New Era for State Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2000, at A1. Few doubt the influence of ideology and public opinion on the
judiciary. Moreover, in the process of litigation wealthy repeat players enjoy advantages over
impecunious individuals. See Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC. 95 (1974).
28. See Paul Tremblay, Acting “A Very Moral Type of God:” Triage Among Poor Clients,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475, 2514-17 (1999) (calling for poverty lawyers to seek a diversified
portfolio of goals and methods).
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The focus on community based advocacy, however, is not easily adapted to
the field of public benefits. After the collapse of the National Welfare Rights
Movement, the prospects for assisting a grass roots movement aimed at
improving the welfare system were bleak.29 The principal goal of recipients
has always been to leave the rolls rather than to stay and fight to improve the
welfare system.30 Moreover, even within poor communities welfare recipients
are often marginalized. Poor communities rarely rally around the issue of
public benefits, in part, because such a focus may further stigmatize the
community. Community leaders are likely to steer clear of issues which
suggest that their neighborhoods consists largely of welfare recipients.
Finally, the structure of the AFDC program was not conducive to a
community based approach. Although some important problems with AFDC
administration could be addressed at the local level, such as the treatment of
applicants or recipients by staff, many of the key program decisions were made
at the federal or state level. The Social Security Act contained detailed
requirements governing the treatment of income, work expenses, child support
payments, and eligibility requirements.31 States set the benefit levels and
chose among a variety of options left open to them by federal law. Although
states were given broader freedom in designing work and training requirements
under the JOBS program,32 and this freedom sometimes translated down to
localities, such programs never assumed major roles in the operation of the
welfare system. At most, only ten percent of adult recipients participated in
JOBS programs.33 Local activism around welfare issues ran up against the
reality that the centers of decision making in the AFDC program were, in many
respects, not local at all.
Thus, the movement toward community based lawyering has looked
principally to issues other than public benefits. Luke Cole, for example, has
highlighted the potential of campaigns for environmental justice as a means of
both improving life in poor communities and as a vehicle for nurturing
community activism.34 Others have stressed the benefits of focusing on

29. See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS 264-359
(1977); Diller, supra note 23, at 1426-1427.
30. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 15-20 (examining
dynamic of deteriorating institutions or systems in which stakeholders choose to either abandon
the institution or remain loyal and seek to improve it).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (repealed 1996) (detailing state plan requirements).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 682 (repealed 1996).
33. See COMMITTEE ON WAYS & MEANS, BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON
PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 486 (1998)
(reporting that in 1995 only 42.6 percent of adults receiving AFDC could be required to
participate in the jobs program, and only 27 percent of these actually participated).
34. See Luke Cole, The Crisis and Opportunity in Public Interest Law: A Challenge to Law
Students to be Rebellious Lawyers in the ‘90s, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1994); Luke Cole,
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community economic development as a means of strengthening critical social
and economic institutions in low income communities.35
Advocates working on public benefits were largely left out of the
movement toward community based strategies. Indeed, the calls for a renewed
emphasis on community building could have the effect of shifting advocacy
resources away form work on public benefits issues in favor of other areas.
Given the critical importance of public benefits, however, such a trend would
be unfortunate.
3. Advocacy in the New Welfare System
A.

The Emerging Structure of TANF

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program is
structured quite differently from its predecessor, the AFDC program.36 The
TANF program eliminates most of the federal requirements that governed the
AFDC program. It contains no federal definition of eligibility and no federal
rules for calculating income and resources. States thus have vast freedom to
design their own programs. Indeed, rather than submitting state plans for
federal approval, states only need submit “outlines” of their TANF programs
for which no federal approval is required.37
Many states are, in turn, delegating significant policymaking authority to
localities and are contracting out portions of TANF administration.38 This
second order devolution is prominent in states such as California, Ohio,
Colorado, and North Carolina in which localities are given explicit policy
making authority.39 In California and Colorado, TANF funds are provided to

Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty
Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992).
35. See Brian Glick & Matthew Rossman, Neighborhood Legal Services as House Counsel
to Community Based Efforts to Achieve Economic Justice: The East Brooklyn Experience, 23
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 105 (1997); Susan Jones, Small Business and Community
Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic Justice, 4
CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (1997); Peter Pitegoff, Child Care Enterprise, Community Development
and Work, 81 GEO. L.J. 1897 (1993).
36. A description of TANF administration appears in Matthew Diller, The Revolution in
Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion & Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1121 (2000).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1). The statute expressly restricts the regulatory authority of the
Department of Health and Human Services. Id. at § 617.
38. See Diller, supra note 36, at 1179-83. See also RICHARD NATHAN & THEODORE GAIS,
IMPLEMENTING THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996: A FIRST LOOK 35-42 (1999).
39. See AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE ASS’N, DEVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AUTHORITY TO THE LOCAL LEVEL: WELFARE REFORM IN FIVE STATES (1998) [hereinafter
DEVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY].
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counties as block grants.40 In Ohio, counties enter into partnership agreements
with the state that constitute the TANF plan for each locality.41
Even absent these dramatic forms of devolution, many states are granting
considerable flexibility to localities. For example, many states require
applicants for assistance to undertake job searches while their claims are
pending.42 In many areas, the nature and contents of these requirements are
left up to the localities.43 Similarly, considerable local discretion is often
exercised in decisions to pay lump sum amounts to “divert” applicants from
the welfare rolls. Localities are also frequently accorded discretion in defining
the content of work requirements.
In shifting authority to states and localities, many TANF programs are also
according greater discretion to their ground level administrative personnel. In
many places, the functions of ground level personnel are being redefined.
Eligibility specialists, whose jobs were viewed as clerical, are being replaced
by case managers with broad authority to advise, assist and supervise clients.44
As one newspaper article put it, the case manager is intended to serve as “a
teacher, preacher, friend and cop—an all-purpose partner to guide poor parents
into jobs.”45
In this new regime, agency personnel operate under many fewer rule based
constraints. Instead, program leadership is provided through performance
based evaluation systems that link funding and other incentives to measurable
outcomes.46 This new emphasis on outcomes is intended to replace fixed rules
with a set of incentives intended to spur local agencies and contractors to
produce particular results.47 In such a system, the key policy decisions are
40. See id. at 11-16 (describing Colorado’s TANF program); JANET QUINT ET AL., BIG
CITIES AND WELFARE REFORM 79-80 (1999) (describing CalWORKS).
41. See DEVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 27-32; Miriam
Wilson & Charles F. Adams, Jr. Welfare Reform: Ohio’s Response, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1357
(1999).
42. See KATHLEEN MALOY ET AL., A DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF STATE
APPROACHES TO DIVERSION PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES UNDER WELFARE REFORM 32-40
(1998).
43. Id. at 37.
44. DEVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY, supra note 39, at 27-32.
45. See Jason Deparle, For Caseworker, Helping is a Frustrating Struggle, NY TIMES, Dec.
10, 1999, at A1, A26.
46. See Diller, supra note 36, at 1183-85.
47. The emphasis of welfare reform on performance measurement is part of a broad trend in
public administration. See, e.g., Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993) (requiring federal agencies to prepare performance goals and
measure and report outcomes in relation to these goals). See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS 10 (2001) (describing
administrative reforms focused on “results-oriented and accountability based management
approaches” intended to “deliver economical, efficient and effective programs and services to the
American people”); Mary L. Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform: Improving Program
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reflected in outcome measurements and other performance incentives that give
direction to the system as a whole.48
In addition to this administrative restructuring of welfare, there have been
major substantive shifts, as well as an infusion of resources. Despite the
Family Support Act of 1988,49 the AFDC program served principally as a
means of income maintenance. The principal function of the program was the
payment of benefits to families who were eligible for assistance and who
complied with program conditions. In contrast, TANF programs are
principally oriented toward getting recipient off the benefit rolls. In some
places, this emphasis may amount simply to a push to terminate assistance or
to create barriers to entry.50 In other areas, greater attention may be paid to
placing recipients in employment.51 Throughout the country, however, the
rhetoric of promoting self sufficiency is overwhelmingly dominant.
A final characteristic of the new welfare system is critically important.
The new system is simply awash in money. The abundance of resources is the
result of a confluence of several factors. First, the formula for which state
TANF block grants are set is based on the federal funding levels of the AFDC
program in the early 1990s.52 These levels were elevated due to the recession
in the early part of the decade. As caseloads have fallen, federal funding has
remained constant, thus yielding a huge surplus of funds. Although many
states have siphoned off a portion of these funds for other purposes,53 there is
no lack of money available for assisting low income families. Second, as part
of its promise to follow through on welfare reform, the Clinton Administration
has goaded Congress into providing money on top of federal TANF funding.
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 provided an additional 3 billion dollars to
fund welfare to work programs administered by state and local governments
during fiscal years 1998 and 1999.54 The funds are intended to assist long term

Oversight Under the Government Performance and Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751,
756 (2000) (describing broad trend in public management to shift focus from “inputs” to
“outputs”).
48. Diller, supra note 36, at 1185.
49. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343.
50. The City of New York provides a good example of such an approach. See Reynolds v.
Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d. 331 (S.D. N.Y. 1999).
51. See, e.g., VIRGINIA KNOX, ET AL., REFORMING WELFARE AND REWARDING WORK: A
SUMMARY OF THE FINAL REPORT ON THE MINNESOTA FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM (2000),
at http://www.mdrc.org/Reports2000/MFIP/MFIPSummary.htm (reporting on results of
Minnesota’s efforts to encourage and reduce dependence while also reducing poverty).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1).
53. See, e.g., Raymond Hernandez, Federal Welfare Overhaul Allows Albany to Shift Money
Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000, at A1 (reporting that the State of New York used over $ 1
billion in federal TANF funding for purposes other than assisting the poor and noting that other
states have similarly diverted welfare funds to other uses).
54. Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 5001.
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welfare recipients in making the transition to work. Furthermore, the strength
of the economy has produced budget surpluses in many states and localities,
thus reducing the pressure to take money out of the welfare system.
Finally, the Work Force Investment Act of 199855 consolidated a number
of federal job training programs and established a new structure for such
programs. Under the Act, recipients of public assistance are given a priority
for enrollment in adult job training programs.56 The new law stresses local
decision making and control, as funds are dispensed through state and local
work force investment boards.57 In fact, 85 percent of the funding available for
training adults is allocated at the local level.58 The Workforce Investment Act
thus provides an additional source of funds that may be available to provide
services to public assistance recipients.
In sum, the TANF program differs from AFDC in at least four critical
respects. Decision-making authority is shifted downward, as power is
dispersed from the federal government to states, and from states to localities
and private contractors. Second, there is a trend toward increasing the
discretion of ground level workers. Many important features of TANF are not
reflected in written rules of general applicability. Agencies, however, steer the
exercise of discretion through performance standards and other forms of
incentives. Third, on a rhetorical level, and to a certain extent in practice, the
focus has shifted from income maintenance to the promotion of self sufficiency
and work. Finally, there is an abundance of funds available to create and
sustain new initiatives.
B.

Advocacy Opportunities Under TANF

These four changes have major ramifications for the nature of advocacy in
the welfare system. They further diminish the potential of litigation as a means
of effecting broad changes in the welfare system. As the system becomes
fragmented, each administering agency is responsible for a smaller piece of the
whole. Correspondingly, there is less likely to be a single defendant in
litigation who has broad control over the entire system. As functions are
devolved and contracted out to private service providers, the welfare system
has become increasingly polycentric, characterized by the complex interaction
of many players instead of a top-down hierarchy of power. In this sense,
welfare has come to resemble issues such as housing and health care.
Moreover, as the discretion of lower level administrative personnel
expands, litigation is less likely to be a simple matter of identifying and

55. Pub. L. No. 105-22.
56. Id. at § 134 (d)(4)(E).
57. See id. at §§ 111, 116.
58. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OVERVIEW OF THE WORKFORCE INVESTMENT ACT OF 1998,
available at http://usworkforce.org/runningtext2.htm.
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challenging an unlawful rule. Instead, advocates must uncover and document
the defacto policies that are cloaked by the language of discretion and then
manage to identify some legal authority upon which to base a claim. The days
of bringing litigation by matching up one set of rules with another are largely
in the past.
On the other hand, taken together, the changes in the welfare system create
new opportunities for community based welfare advocacy. As localities and
private contractors play increasingly important roles in the welfare system,
advocacy must shift to the local level in order to be effective. There are no
fixed prescriptions for effective advocacy on the local level. Advocates in
each community need to identify the best means of influencing the
administrative and political system in their county or city. To do so, they must
identify and, in many instances, create points of access to the key decisionmaking processes.
In some places, effective advocacy will center around county or municipal
legislative bodies. The New York City Council, for example, has played an
increasingly active role in shaping policies with regard to workfare and
assistance to the homeless.59 In other places, effective advocacy may target the
executive branches. In Philadelphia, for example, advocates worked closely
with the Mayor in shaping the City’s implementation of welfare reform.60
Programs funded by the Workforce Investment Act are overseen, in the first
instance, by local Workforce Investment Boards. Advocates may direct their
efforts at influencing both the selection of board members and the decisions of
these local boards.61
In areas where aspects of welfare administration have been contracted out,
advocates must seek involvement in the contracting process. Critical decisions
are generally reflected in the terms of the contract, such as the specification of
contract requirements, the provisions governing payment to providers and the
means of government oversight. Together these elements of a contract
establish the set of incentives that will, to a large extent, determine the manner
in which a program is administered. Unfortunately, there are few formal
means of influencing the process by which these terms are established.62

59. See City of New York, Local Law 00/13 (grievance procedures for workfare program);
City of New York, Local Law 00/14 (transitional jobs for public assistance recipients); City of
New York, Local Law 99/06 (limits on size of emergency shelters for adults).
60. Biennan Center for Justice, Legal Services Lawyers Work Closely with Communities in
Need, at 16 (2000) (reporting that Mayor Rendell invited community legal services to help
develop strategies for dealing with federal welfare reform).
61. Local boards must have a majority of business representatives and representatives of
labor organizations, community based organizations and service providers. Board members are
selected by local elected officials in accordance with criteria established by the governor of each
state.
62. See Diller, supra note 36, at 1195-1206.
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Nonetheless, advocacy in a privatized system is not necessarily futile.
Advocates can develop creative means of influencing the way in which private
contractors provide services.
Public contracting procedures may provide a point of access to decision
making under the TANF program.63 Advocates may be able to harness
requirements designed to ensure the integrity of government contracting as a
vehicle for input into the selection of private providers and, perhaps, as a way
of influencing the substance of contracts with such providers. Recent disputes
over the process of contracting for welfare services in New York and San
Diego illustrate some of the potential of such an avenue of advocacy. In New
York, accusations of influence peddling and failure to use competitive bidding
derailed a $100 million dollar contract with Maximus, the large corporation
selling welfare administrative services nationwide.64 Although the contracts
were ultimately upheld in the courts, they have not gone forward as originally
planned.65 In San Diego recipients and the union of public employees
successfully sued to enjoin privatization of case management services.66 The
court concluded that the county charter prohibited the “wholesale” contracting
of discretionary functions such as case management.67
In addition, advocates may be able to develop channels of communication
with private welfare administrators. Ironically, contractors may have a
stronger interest in maintaining a positive public image than many government
agencies. The contracting process is frequently political and providers may
wish to forestall vocal opposition from client advocates. The large national
companies who have recently entered the business of welfare administration
may find it bad for business on a national level if they develop reputations for
antagonizing local constituencies. Indeed, conglomerates may be concerned
that controversy over welfare issues will cut into the good will they have
generated in other areas.
For example, in August 1999, the New York Times revealed that
Citigroup, the parent company of Citibank, which has been hired to administer
the electronic benefits payment system for welfare recipients in 29 states,

63. See id. at 1198-99.
64. See Christopher Drew & Eric Lipton, 2 with Ties to Chief of Welfare Got Jobs with
Major Contractor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000, at A1; Eric Lipton, City Contracts for Workfare
Are Criticized, NY TIMES, Mar. 14, 2000, at B1.
65. See Giuliani v. Hevesi, 276 A.D.2d 398, 715 N.Y.S.2d 12 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2000)
(holding that New York City Mayor could override objections of New York City Comptroller).
As of March 15, 2001, Maximus has not commenced operations in New York and it is not clear
when it will do so. Conversation with Glenn Passanen, the City Project, March 16, 2001.
66. See Karen Kucher, County CalWorks Pacts May be Illegal Judge Tentatively Rules
Against Millions in Farmed-out Contracts, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 22, 2000, at B1; Karen
Kucher, Lawsuit Targets Welfare Contracts, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 3, 1999, at B1.
67. Kucher, County CalWorks Pacts, supra note 66, at B1.
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charged fees and imposed limitations on the use of ATM cards that it does not
apply to its other customers.68 In anticipation of the article, Citibank officials
immediately moved to provide greater access to cash in poor neighborhoods in
New York.69 It may well be that the ameliorative moves were not significant
in this instance,70 but the incident suggests that companies which spend
millions in advertising to generate good will, may have reasons to respond to
advocates for the poor.71
Advocacy in this new landscape of fragmented and devolved welfare
administration is likely to require a new set of skills and technical knowledge.
Advocates must become adept at deciphering the gnarled prose of the contracts
and agreements that frequently constitute the governing source of authority in
the new system. To be effective, advocates must be able to identify the key
policy decisions in such documents and must learn to gauge the impact of the
various oversight mechanisms that these documents frequently employ. They
must develop a concrete agenda of substantive and procedural points that they
believe should be included in the instruments that bestow authority on
contractors and localities.
As part of this new set of skills, advocates must be develop expertise in
performance based evaluation. The task of formulating performance measures
requires translating a set of policy goals into discrete quantifiable standards.
Thus, the amorphous goal of promoting family well-being can be broken down
into particular indices such as increases in income and earnings, or broader
measures that look to infant mortality rates, school completion rates, eviction
rates, levels of homelessness and so forth. In a system centered on
performance based evaluation, advocates must identify their goals and reduce
them to a specific set of demands. The task is complicated by the reality that
agencies subject to performance measures generally look for the easiest means
of achieving the measure, which frequently means finding ways to achieve
statistical success, rather than attainment of more difficult overall objectives.
Programs can look good on paper, while accomplishing little of value.
Moreover performance measures that are too broad may be self defeating if
their achievement is not within the control of agency that is subject to the
standard. Thus, a goal of reducing poverty may sound impressive but yield

68. See David Barstow, ATM Cards Fail to Live Up to Promises to Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.,
16, 1999, at A1.
69. Id.
70. The bank announced it would install 25 ATMs in poor neighborhoods and enable
recipients to use their cards in the NYCE network of 23,000 machines. Id. It did not, however,
drop its fees or provide access through other networks. Id.
71. Investor relations offers another possible avenue of influence over private welfare
administrators. Campaigns may be organized to boycott the stock of companies that treat welfare
recipients unfairly.
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little results if the actors that are subject to the goal do not in fact have the
means at their disposal to achieve the desired result.
This discussion suggests that advocates must learn the art of analyzing and
constructing performance standards. The General Accounting Office has
cautioned that many state and local governments do not have adequate
experience and expertise to design and utilize performance measures
effectively.72 For this reason, it is especially important that advocates monitor
and participate in the process of formulating performance standards. At the
same time, advocates must themselves gain the skills necessary to play a
constructive role and to gain credibility.73
The shift in the welfare system from income support to work also requires
welfare lawyers to develop new expertise in the problems facing low
wageworkers. Although the divide between the “working poor” and the
“welfare poor” was always artificial, welfare lawyers did not generally focus
on workplace issues. Under welfare reform, however, work and welfare have
become thoroughly intertwined: Work is now frequently a requirement of
benefit receipt and a variety of TANF related benefits might be available to
those who work. Events, which jeopardize a client’s job, also jeopardize her
benefits case. The need for advocates with expertise in the intersection of
welfare and work is acute.
This substantive shift in emphasis from the AFDC to the TANF program
may actually invigorate efforts to activate communities around public benefits
issues. Lawyers interested in community organizing may be able to focus
more directly on the welfare system than in the past. Advocates can demand
that welfare systems live up to the rhetoric of welfare reform by providing
meaningful assistance to poor mothers in finding and retaining jobs.
Moreover, advocates can work to improve the quality of life for mothers
pushed into low wage jobs by seeking to use public benefits programs and
other funding streams to create social supports for working parents. Issues
such as child care, transportation and health coverage are obvious subjects of
advocacy.
Advocacy around these issues may be particularly promising because it
seeks to coopt the rhetoric of welfare reform, rather than simply serving as an
exercise in resistance. These issues may strike a chord in public opinion.
After all, welfare reform was billed as a change in the manner and means of
helping poor families, not simply as a process of abandonment.

72. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SERVICE PRIVATIZATION: EXPANSION
POSES CHALLENGES FOR ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY OF PROGRAM RESULTS 17 (1997).
73. There is a substantial body of literature on performance measurement. See, e.g., MARK
FRIEDMAN, A GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND USING PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN RESULTSBASED BUDGETING (1997), available at http://www.financeproject.org/measures.html. See also
HARRY HATRY, PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT: GETTING RESULTS (1999).
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These issues may provide more effective focal points for community
advocacy than did traditional income support issues. First, clients may be
more likely to organize and agitate around these issues because they reflect the
desire of many clients to become self supporting. As noted above, even though
income support may have been vital to many families, clients were reluctant to
organize around the issue because, individually, their goal was to leave the
welfare rolls.
The objectives of securing jobs and the social supports necessary to
succeed in the workplace, however, coincide with mainstream American
norms. Recipients who organized to assert claims for income support sailed
against the tide of social norms and risked being viewed as deviant.74 In
contrast, recipients who agitate for training, better jobs, child care and so forth
do not present claims that are likely to be perceived as threatening to dominant
values. For the same reason, leaders of institutions in low income
communities may be more willing to champion the cause of welfare recipients,
when it is centered on issues such as training, and child care, than when it
simply focuses on income support. They are more likely to perceive these
issues as projecting positive images of their communities, while claims for
income support may be perceived as reinforcing negative stereotypes.
Second, as the locus of decision making is shifted down to the local level,
community activism may be more relevant and effective because it is closer to
the level at which meaningful programmatic decisions are made. One of the
insights of the environmental justice movement is that it is much easier to
mobilize people around issues of immediate local concern, such as an
undesirable land use in their neighborhood, than around broader more
amorphous issues. For much the same reason, the devolution of welfare is
likely to make it easier to organize communities around issues relating to
public benefits.
Finally, community based advocacy around these issues is likely to be
facilitated by the fact that there is ample money to fund new programs. Thus,
demands for new services and social supports present goals that are attainable.
Welfare advocates can present a positive agenda that is realistic, rather than
simply hoping to forestall cuts while arguing for affirmative measures that are
patently beyond realm of possibility.
Advocates can also create new roles for themselves in assisting community
based service providers in obtaining government grants and contracts. These
groups frequently lack the expertise necessary to tap into sources of available
government funding and to comply with the onerous administrative
requirements that frequently accompany government funding. Advocates can
74. See Lucy Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs
Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159, 1177-84 (1995) (describing negative
reaction to welfare rights activists in the 1960’s).
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help to fill these needs. In fact, welfare advocacy may in some instances
converge with community economic development work as welfare can serve as
a funding stream for neighborhood day care and job training centers.
C. Concluding Caveats and Cautionary Notes
This discussion points to some reasons why the process of welfare reform
may help invigorate community activism around welfare issues and identifies
some important new roles that advocates can play. These points are subject to
two important caveats. First, even in the new system, traditional elements of
advocacy continue to be important. Not everything that is transpiring under
welfare reform is new. Regulations are still written that violate statutory
commands.75 Notices still go out that fail to provide proper information.76
States still use hearing procedures that fall short of legal requirements.77
Program rules may still transgress the limits of constitutionality.78 In other
words, there will continue to be important issues that demand litigation.
Similarly, on many issues state and national advocacy are still vitally
important. For example, the TANF program is up for reauthorization in
Congress in 2002, a process fraught with opportunities and perils.
Second, although the new system creates greater potential for local
activism, emphasis needs to be placed on the term potential – as yet, it is far
from clear whether the final product of welfare reform will be more open or
more closed to input than its predecessor. As I and others have argued
elsewhere, devolution cannot be equated with openness or accessibility.79
While the process has made a number of traditional advocacy tools less
efficacious, devolution does not readily supply alternative means of assuring
public input. Instead, the central challenge for advocates is to forge a new set
of strategies and tools that reflect the changing structure of public benefits
programs. Although this essay outlines a number of possibilities, it is far too
early to discern the efficacy of these new techniques.

75. See Smith v. Commissioner of Transitional Assistance, 729 N.E.2d 627 (Mass. 2000)
(striking down regulation limiting extensions of the time limit on benefits as violative of state
statute); Minnefield v. McIntire, 11 Mass.L.Rptr. 369 (Super. Ct. Mass. 2000) (striking down
regulation that impermissibly made it more difficult for caretakers of disabled children to receive
exemptions from work requirements).
76. See Weston v. Hammons, Case No. 99 CV 412 (District Ct., City and Cy. of Denver,
Nov. 5, 1999) (sanction notices in Colorado TANF program violate due process), available at
http://www.welfarelaw.org/webbul/99novdec.htm#CO (sanction notices are constitutionally
inadequate).
77. See Meachem v. Wing, 77 F. Supp.2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
78. See Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999) (striking down lower tier of benefits for new
residents as unconstitutional).
79. See Diller, supra note 36, at 1206-10; see generally JOEL HANDLER, DOWN FROM
BUREAUCRACY (1996).
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Despite these caveats, it is clear that the major changes in the structure of
the welfare system have profound ramifications for the nature and direction of
welfare advocacy. Welfare lawyers can now move from the periphery to the
center of the movement toward community lawyering, as important
programmatic decisions are increasingly made at the local level. Although the
multi-tiered layers of rules that characterized the AFDC program appeared to
be dauntingly complex, the absence of rules has created a welfare system that,
in comparison, makes the AFDC program look straightforward. The number
of players has increased, the arsenal of carrots and sticks used to exert control
over recipients has expanded and the ability of the rules to constrain both
policy makers and ground level administrators has diminished. Within all this,
advocates for people in poverty must identify the pivotal decision points and
find or create opportunities to have an impact on the shape and content of the
new welfare system.

